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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(h), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1
Did Defendant reside, in the marital relationship, within this state, for purposes of in
personam jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding, where he lived and worked in this state during the
marriage but maintained his permanent domicile in another state?
ISSUE NO. 2
Did the Trial Court err by ruling that Utah does not have jurisdiction over Defendant
where acts that created the irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties, and which
were relied on in granting the Decree of Divorce, occurred in the State of Utah.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of this appeal is de novo because the issue of jurisdiction is one of
law. See Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah App. 1995); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d
157, 160 (Utah Ap. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(6) (1998)
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or related to . ..
1

(6)

With respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, having

resided, in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure
from the state; or the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long
as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant
had no control.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce in this matter on May 14, 1997, seeking a
divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction on or about September 10, 1997, claiming that he had not resided in Utah
with the Plaintiff during their marriage.
In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had
lived in Utah on several occasions during the marriage while he worked on projects in this state.
Plaintiff alleged that one of the differences between the parties that resulted in the action for
divorce was Defendant's marital infidelity which occurred in Utah while he was working and
living in this state. Plaintiff also claimed that Defendant had stayed at her residence in Utah on
several occasions since she moved here in 1992, but she acknowledged they had not shared the
same bed during those stays.
At a hearing held on November 10, 1997, the Trial Court denied the Motion to
Dismiss.
As he was permitted to do, Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss on June 16,
1998, this time supported by his Affidavit, claiming that he had not engaged in any extra-marital
relationship within the State of Utah.
2

Plaintiff responded to this Second Motion to Dismiss by acknowledging that she could
not prove that Defendant's acts of infidelity occurred within the borders of the State of Utah, but
maintained that he was living in Utah when the infidelity occurred.
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was combined with a hearing
on Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, Plaintiff testified that grounds for the divorce included
irreconcilable differences arising out of Defendant's excessive use of alcohol and that he had
committed those acts in Utah. The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate, finding that it had
jurisdiction over the marriage, but also granted the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Defendant did
not have sufficient contacts with Utah for the Court to determine any issues other than
dissolution of the marriage. This appeal followed that Order of Dismissal.
2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on March 27, 1954, in Riverside, Bingham
County Idaho. (See Affidavit of Margaret Lucille Lent, filed September 29, 1997) (R. at 26)
During the parties' marriage the Defendant worked in the State of Utah on several
occasions and, in several instances, for extended periods of time. (R. at 26-27)
The Defendant worked at a power plant in Castle Gate, Utah, from April of 1957 until
some time during the month of July of 1957. Defendant lived in Utah that entire time.
(R. at 27) Defendant brought the parties' children and Plaintiff to stay with him for about two
weeks while he worked there. Plaintiff and Defendant stayed at a motel in, Helper, or one of the
surrounding communities. (R. at 27)
In 1960, from March through July, the Defendant was working on a project at Geneva
Steel in Utah County, Utah. He lived in Utah that entire time. The parties' children and Plaintiff
accompanied the Defendant to the area where he worked. The Plaintiff and Defendant stayed at
3

a red brick colored complex where some of Defendant's associates were also living for the length
of the project. Plaintiff believes the complex was on Main Street in Pleasant Grove, Utah
County, Utah. The Plaintiff and Defendant resided together at that time for approximately two
weeks. (R. at 27)
From April of 1961 until sometime in August of 1961 the Defendant worked on the
construction of the Flaming Gorge Dam near Dutch John, Utah. During that time Defendant
came to Pocatello to get Plaintiff and Defendant and Plaintiff traveled to the place he was living
at in the Dutch John/ Manilla area of Utah ( about 35 miles from Vernal). Plaintiff and
Defendant and their children lived in a mobile unit designed like a complex with another couple
occupying the other half while Defendant worked there. Plaintiff was there with him for
approximately two weeks. (R. at 27)
On the instances that Plaintiff recalls when the Defendant was working in Utah and
Plaintiff resided with him, the Defendant and Plaintiff clearly did so as husband and wife so that
they could be together while Defendant worked in the State of Utah. They shared the same bed
and Plaintiff maintained the home. (R. at 27-28)
In 1976, from March 10 until June 16, Defendant lived in Utah and worked on the Carbon
Power Plant near Castlegate, Utah. (R. at 28)
There are numerous other instances when Defendant has lived and worked in Utah for
shorter periods of time. (R. at 28)
One of the irreconcilable differences that developed during Plaintiff and the Defendant's
marriage arose out of Defendant's marital infidelity. That marital infidelity occurred while the
Defendant was working in the State of Utah. (R. at 28)
Defendant denies having engaged in any extra marital relationship within the State of
4

Utah. (R. at 74-75)
There was a four to five week period of time in approximately 1992, while Plaintiff was
attending school in Provo, Utah, that the Defendant stayed at her apartment. Plaintiff and
Defendant slept separately on that occasion because the sleeping facilities were limited to one
small single bed. (R. at 28)
The Defendant and Plaintiff resided together at Plaintiffs residence in Provo while
Defendant was working on a job on the boiler at the Brigham Young University campus in 1992
or 1993. Plaintiff and Defendant didn't share a bed on that occasion but Plaintiff fixed
Defendant's lunch and other meals and did Defendant's laundry. (R. at 28)
There was an additional week when the Defendant came and resided with Plaintiff in
Provo to repair Plaintiffs car. (R. at 28-29)
On another occasion, sometime in 1992 or 1993, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff on his
way to a job at Delta, Utah. On that occasion Defendant became ill and was hospitalized in Delta
with severe back pain. When Defendant was well enough to drive he came back to Provo to stay
at Plaintiffs apartment. Defendant ultimately did return to Pocatello on that occasion. (R. at
29)
While Plaintiff was in Provo the Defendant spent Thanksgiving and Christmas with
Plaintiff there. On one occasion Plaintiff and Defendant had Thanksgiving dinner with a family
at the Excelsior Hotel and Defendant helped with gift wrapping and Christmas lights. (R. at 29)
Because of tax advantages the Defendant and Plaintiff had declared Idaho as their
permanent residence. As Plaintiff understood it the Defendant was able to deduct rent and
expenses in other states if they did so. However, there have been numerous instances during the
parties' marriage, as indicated above, when the Plaintiff claims that Defendant has resided in the
5

State of Utah while working and, on occasion, Plaintiff has joined him here. (R. at 29)
Although Defendant does not deny Plaintiffs allegations concerning his work history and
where he lived while working in Utah, he did sign an affidavit in which he claimed that he had
"never been a resident of the State of Utah." (R. at 74)
Although the Plaintiff cannot prove that the Defendant's act of sexual intercourse with
another woman occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah, the Defendant has engaged
in acts of sexual intercourse while he was living and working in the State of Utah. The Plaintiff
confronted the Defendant about whether he had had sexual intercourse with another woman
during one of the times he lived in Utah and he did not deny that he had sex with another woman.
In fact, his response was, "Everybody has slept with her, including Butch." (R. at 73)
The Plaintiff has seen a Utah birth certificate for a child born approximately 35 years ago
and Defendant was listed as the father on that birth certificate. Plaintiff has attempted to locate a
copy of that birth certificate and has been unable to do so. (R. at 72)
Although the Defendant and Plaintiff do have assets in the State of Idaho, the Defendant
is a member of the Boilermakers Local Union No. 182 in Salt Lake City, Utah. This is the
source of Defendant's retirement plan. (R. at 29-30)
At trial the Plaintiff testified that, since 1995, the Defendant had spent time in her home,
including staying overnight in her home although the parties have not shared the same bedroom.
She also testified that one of the irreconcilable differences that arose between the parties during
their marriage was the Defendant's consumption of alcohol in the State of Utah. (R. at 106 page
13-17)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Although the Defendant did not officially change his domicile, he did reside in the
6

marital relationship within the state as required by UCA §78-27-24(6) in the following
particulars:
(1)

He resided in the State of Utah while the parties were married and he worked

in the State of Utah;
(2)

He resided with the Plaintiff for brief periods of time while she lived in the

State of Utah since 1995.
The irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties and resulted in the entry of a
Decree of Divorce included not only infidelity, which the Plaintiff is unable to prove actually
occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah, but the Defendant's use and abuse of
alcohol, which Plaintiff did testify at trial occurred within the State of Utah as recently as since
1995. Therefore, Plaintiff maintains that at least some of the "acts" giving rise to the Plaintiffs
claim of irreconcilable differences arising out of Defendant's alcohol use were committed in this
state.
Since the Defendant did reside in the marital relationship within this state and acts giving
rise to the Plaintiffs claim for divorce based on irreconcilable differences were also committed
in this state, the Trial Court had jurisdiction over Defendant and should not have dismissed the
Plaintiffs Complaint for want of in personam jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) provides as follows:
"Any person . .. who .. .does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself,. ..
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: (6)with respect
to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the
7

state; or the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act
is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the Respondent had no
control; . . ."
If the Defendant "resided, in the marital relationship, within this state" or if Defendant
committed any act in this state giving rise to Plaintiffs claim, then this Court has jurisdiction
over the Defendant.
A.

DEFENDANT RESIDED IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP IN THIS

STATE.
Plaintiff does not maintain that the Defendant was an "actual and bonafide resident" of
this state, as would be required under UCA §30-3-l(2)if Plaintiff were seeking to have this Court
exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case based on Defendant's "actual and
bonafide" residency. There is clearly a difference between actual and bonafide residence of the
county in which the proceeding is commenced in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction and
"residence in the marital relationship" in order to confer jurisdiction over a party. The Fifth
District Court has jurisdiction over the Defendant because he resided in this state while working
here for periods of time during the parties' marriage. He did so on several occasions during the
parties' marriage in conjunction with his employment and while the Plaintiff was attending
school in Utah County.
The terms "resided" and "marital relationship" will be considered separately in analyzing
whether Defendant's conduct satisfies the minimal contacts required for in personam jurisdiction
in a divorce proceeding.
The term "marital relationship" means nothing more than that the parties are married i.e.,
had the relationship of husband and wife, at the time the event occurred. In essence, this means
8

that if a party resided in the State of Utah prior to being married and never resided in the State of
Utah while the parties' were married this Court would not have jurisdiction over that party since
the residence in the State of Utah had not occurred during the marital relationship i.e. while the
parties' were married.
In this instance, the acts which the Plaintiff claims give rise to this Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the Defendant, including Defendant's residence in this state, did occur while the
parties' were married i.e. during the marital relationship.
The next key term that needs to be considered is the term "reside."
Had the Utah State legislature intended that a party have been an "actual and bonafide
resident" of the State of Utah during the marital relationship in order for this Court to assert
jurisdiction the legislature clearly could have done so. However, the legislature, instead, chose to
grant jurisdiction over a party if he had resided, during the marriage, in this State. The
distinction between "actual and bonafide resident, " required under UCA §30-3-1 to confer
subject matter jurisdiction and "residing" in the state for a period of time in order to confer in
personam jurisdiction is not insignificant.
There is a distinction between "actual and bonafide residence" and residence in the state.
In 25 Am Jur 2d Domicile §4 the commentator notes that:
"'Residence' may mean a temporary, permanent, or transient character; or it may means
one's fixed abode, depending on the particular object of it's use. In determining it's
meaning as it is used in particular pieces of legislation, it's context within the statute and
the legislative purpose are examined. Thus, in some instances, residence requires mere
physical presence, while in others something more than physical presence is required and
the element of intent becomes material, even where "residence" is not deemed to be the
equivalent of a "domicile."
In 25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 6 the commentator notes as follows:
"A distinction between "legal residence" and "actual residence" has been recognized.
9

"Actual residence" has connotations of a more temporary character, while the phrase "legal
residence" is sometimes used as the equivalent of domicile."
The term "actual and bonafide resident" is more akin to the "legal residence" referred to
in Am Jur 2d Domicile. On the other hand, the legislature's use of the term "resident," without
any limitations, is more like the term "actual residence" as used in the Am Jur 2d Domicile
article. The legislature quite clearly intended that a party reside in the State of Utah during the
marriage, i.e., live in this state, not that he have attained the status of "legal residence" in order
to confer in personam jurisdiction.
In Smiling v. Gardner, 590 N.E. P.2d 330 (Ohio App. 1990) the Ohio Court of Appeals
noted, in reversing a trial court's failure to assume in personam jurisdiction under URESA that
"The trial court, however, appears to have grounded its decision upon an assumption that
respondent's residence is equivalent to respondent's domicile. Although the terms
"residence" and "domicile" are frequently used interchangeably, they in fact are distinctly
different, albeit related, concepts, [citations omitted] 'Domicile' has most often been defined
as a legal relationship between a person and a particular place which contemplates two
factors: first, residence, at least for some period of time and, second, the intent to reside in
that place permanently or at least indefinitely, [citations omitted]
Thus, 'residence' is encompassed within the definition of 'domicile.' An important
distinction, however, lies in the fact that, while a person can only have one domicile, he
generally may have more than one residence." [citations omitted] Id at 332-333.
In Snelling the trial court concluded that, while the State of Ohio was not the
respondent's domicile he was capable of having multiple residence and that he had resided in the
State of Ohio.
Plaintiff does not claim that the Defendant was domiciled in the State of Utah. However,
just as the respondent in Snelling resided in the State of Ohio, the Defendant in this proceeding
resided in the State of Utah in the marital relationship.
The Utah State Legislature clearly intended that the Defendant in a divorce proceeding
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have some contact with this state more than just passing through the state or staying overnight on
vacation. However, to live or reside in the state while working here for weeks at a time, even if a
party retained his legal domicile in another state, would satisfy that requirement.
In this case the Defendant resided in the State of Utah for periods of time during the
parties' marriage while he worked on various projects in conjunction with his full-time
employment. Joint residency in this state does not appear to be required by the statute i.e. the
statute does not appear to require that the parties have slept in the same bed in this state.
However, on occasion when the Plaintiff did come and reside with the Defendant in this state the
Plaintiff and Defendant did share the same bed and maintain a marital household.
The Defendant clearly had the benefits of the laws of the State of Utah while he resided
in this state in conjunction with his employment. Although he may never have acquired the
status of legal domicile, his actual residence in this state is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
him in this divorce proceeding.
B.

THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OCCURRED IN

THIS STATE.
1. Marital Infidelity
Plaintiff claims that the irreconcilable differences that exist arose out of, among other
things, Defendant's marital infidelity and alcohol abuse. Plaintiff could not prove that the
Defendant committed sexual intercourse within the boundaries of the State of Utah. However his
instances of infidelity did occur while he was working in the State of Utah and, therefore, the
irreconcilable differences arose while he was in this state, even if the actual acts of sexual
intercourse were consummated in a neighboring state. Therefore, although Plaintiff might not be
able to prove that the Defendant engaged in sexual intercourse within the boundaries of the State
11

of Utah, if the infidelity occurred during a period of time that Defendant was residing in the State
of Utah, working on projects in this State, and the grounds for divorce are irreconcilable
differences, arising out of, among other things, the Defendant's marital infidelity, a trial court in
Utah should assert jurisdiction based on UCA §78-27-24(6). That statute should not be restricted
so as to protect a person from the jurisdiction of a court of this state where the party is residing in
the State of Utah at the time the marital infidelity occurred but steps across the state line, if that
is the case, in order to consummate a specific act of infidelity.
2. ALCOHOL USE
UCA §78-27-24(6) "indicates that this court has jurisdiction over a person who
commits in this state .. .the act giving rise to the claim,..." In this instance as in many divorces
it is impossible to isolate one specific act that created the irreconcilable differences. There are
typically numerous acts that eventually result in a conclusion that the differences between the
parties are irreconcilable. In this instance, the Defendant's use and abuse of alcohol is an act, or
acts, that occurred on numerous occasions but also which occurred in the State of Utah.
The evidence before the Court in this instance established that the Defendant had
committed the act of alcohol use and that this act, or these acts, created one of the irreconcilable
differences which resulted in this divorce. Defendant had committed that act, or acts, in the State
of Utah. Since that act, the use of alcohol, occurred within this state and that is the act or, at
least, one of the acts giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim for irreconcilable differences, and the
trial court granted the Plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the trial
court had jurisdiction over the Defendant and should have heard the remainder of the pending
case.
Since the act or acts which resulted in irreconcilable differences were committed by the
12

Defendant within the State of Utah, the trial court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs
Complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Although the Defendant did not officially change his domicile or full-time residence, the
Defendant did reside in marital relationship within the State of Utah. He worked for extensive
periods of time in the State of Utah while maintaining a domicile in the State of Idaho. He
resided in Utah during those periods of time. The Defendant also resided with the Plaintiff for
brief of periods of time since 1995 while she was living in Provo, Utah and attending school.
The trial court had jurisdiction over the Defendant based on his having resided in the marital
relationship in the State of Utah.
The irreconcilable differences that arose between the parties arose because of acts
committed by the Defendant while he was residing in the State of Utah. Although the Plaintiff
could not prove to the trial court that the sexual act that evidenced the Defendant's marital
infidelity occurred within the boundaries of the state, she did present testimony which was
accepted by the trial court that the act of alcohol use and abuse occurred within the boundaries of
the State of Utah and that the alcohol use and abuse was an irreconcilable difference that resulted
in the Plaintiffs seeking a Decree of Divorce.
The trial court had jurisdiction over the Defendant both because the Defendant had
resided in the marital relationship within the State of Utah and because the Defendant had
committed acts in the State of Utah giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim for a divorce based on
irreconcilable differences and, therefore, the trial court should not have dismissed the Plaintiffs
Complaint. The trial court's Order dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint should be set aside and
the Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed to a trial on the merits in the State of Utah to resolve
13

the remaining issues between the parties.
_ 1999.
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ADDENDUM
Partial Transcript of July 17, 1998 Hearing

i

Order of Dismissal

ix

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law In Re: Bifurcated Decree of Divorce

xi

1

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T

COURT

WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

(ST GEORGE

3

DEPARTMENT)

4
5

MARGARET

LENT,

DIVORCE

HEARING

Case No. 97450000368

Plaintiff,

6

DA

vs .

7
8

LUCILLE

NORMAN

FLOYD

Hon. JAMES

LENT,
Defendant.

9

APPEAL

L.

SHUMATE

#981568

10

ORIGINAL

11

BE IT REMEMBERED

12

that on the 17th day of July,

13

1998 this matter came on regularly

14

before the above-named
WHEREUPON,

15

for

hearing

court.

the parties appearing

and

16

represented by counsel, the following

17

were

proceedings

held:

18
A P P E A R A N C E S

19
FOR THE

PLAINTIFF:

20
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL, ESQ.NOV
59 SOUTH 100 EAST

21

ST.

GEORGE,

UT

84 77 0

Julia D'Alesand

22
23
24
25

c

FOR THE

DEFENDANT:

02 1998

' e * of the Court

%StS-C4

LAMAR J. WINWARD, ESQ
150 NORTH 200 EAST #204
ST GEORGE UT 84770

PENNY C. A B B O T T , CSR - LIC. 2 2-102811-7801
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST, SALEM, UT 84653
PHONE:
423-1009

fah\pm\ IIW\

I

1

any difficulty

2

right now as to grounds and jurisdiction

3

granting her her

4

in allowing M s . Lent to

testify

divorce?

MR. WINWARD:

I would

suggest that

5

happen immediately and then following

6

the decree, the balance of the issues be

7

pursuant

8

to Court's

that

the entry of
dismissed

order.

THE JUDGE:

9

and

And then once she is divorced

then she can go to Idaho as a separate party

and

10

sue for the dissolution of the marital assets at

11

that p o i n t .

12

can't ask for divorce up there but I'll

13

could ask for the property

14

It's a peculiar situation.

MR. WESTFALL:

15

THE JUDGE:

bet

she

interests.

May I have my client

then and testify to that

16

She

issue?

M r s . Lent, would you please

17

face the clerk, raise your right hand and be

18

sworn?

19

WHEREUPON,

20

sworn

MARGARET

LUCILE

LENT

21

having been placed under oath by the clerk of the

22

court and sworn to testify truthfully

23

matter, upon examination testified as follows:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

Ma'am,

I'm

in this

not going to make

you come up to the witness stand but you can have a
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT

REPORTER

II

PAGE 12

MflfMllM if

1

seat right there if you

2

EXAMINATION

3
4
5

would.

THE JUDGE:
full

BY THE

JUDGE.

Would you please state

your

name?
A.

6

Margaret

Lucile

THE JUDGE:

Lent.

M r s . Lent, you have been an

7

actual and bona fide resident of Washington

8

State of Utah for at least three months before

9

14th of 1997.

10

A.

11

Is that

That's

correct.

THE JUDGE:

All right.

you were married

13

27th of 1954 in Bingham County,

14

correct?
A.

16
remained

18

Is that

20

A.

Now M r s . L e n t ,

to Mr. Norman Floyd Lent on March
Idaho.

Is that

correct.

THE JUDGE:

17

19

That's

May

correct?

12

15

County,

And since that time you

have

in the relationship of husband and w i f e .
correct?
That's

correct.

THE JUDGE:

During

the term of your

21

marriage Mr. Lent has behaved

22

it impossible

23

continue having carried on the abuse of

24

such that you simply cannot remain married

for the marriage

in a fashion
relationship

to

alcohol

25 II as well as the other problems that you have
PENNY C. A B B O T T , COURT

making

to him,
had

REPORTER
PAGE

XlLJIim iff
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1
2

with he and other women.
A.

That's

3

Is that

correct?

correct.

THE JUDGE:

All right.

The Court

4

that there is jurisdiction

5

divorce to Margaret Lucile Lent from Norman

6

Lent.

7

grounds are laid.

8

become

9

and placing

Adequate

to grant a decree of
Floyd

jurisdiction has been laid and
The decree of divorce

final and effective

10

finds

shall

immediately upon

signing

in the file.

M r s . Lent, I understand

that it looks very

11

peculiar to you that you can get divorced here but

12

you can't get an order that takes any

13

there.

14

this completely

But I wish you the very best

15
questions

17

allow.

18

in getting

finished out.

MR. WESTFALL:

16

effect

I would

There are a couple of

like to ask if the Court

THE JUDGE:

19

EXAMINATION

20

MR. WESTFALL:

21

period of time that--

22

the State of Utah?

Certainly,
BY MR.

would

Counsel.

WESTFALL

M r s . Lent, during

the

How long have you lived

23 [J

A.

Since July 1st, 1950.

24

Q.

And during the period of time that

in

Or excuse m e , 1995.
you

25 [I have lived in the State of Utah has the defendant,
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT
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1

Norman Floyd Lent, have you seen him in the

2

of

Utah?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Approximately

5
6

State

been in the State of
A.

how many occasions has he

Utah?

Can I back up and say that

I also lived

7

the State of Utah from 1989 to 1993.

8

period of time I've

And in that

seen him probably

10 t i m e s .

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

-- in the State of Utah?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

H a s , during either of those periods

14

And since 1995 have you seen him--

time has he spent any time in your

15

A.

Y e s , he h a s .

16

Q.

Has he stayed overnight

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Have you shared--

19

haven't

in your

home?

You h a v e n ' t , you

shared the same bedroom

though?

A.

That's

21

Q.

He has slept on the couch or

right.

else in the home.

Is that

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

You've indicated

25 II irreconcilable

of

home?

20

22

in

differences

somewhere

correct?

that one of

the

that arose during

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT

your

REPORTER
PAGE

Mdmn

f/f/V) \I\

15

1

marriage was Mr. Lent's consumption of alcohol.

2

that

Is

correct?

3

A.

That's

correct.

4

Q.

And in that context or with regard to the

5

consumption of alcohol have there been

6

when he has visited you in the State and he has

7

consumed

alcohol?

8

MR. WINWARD:

9

instances

Your Honor, I'm going

to

object because this has never been made a part of

10

the pleadings and for the first time is raised

11

today.

And the divorce has already been

12

THE JUDGE:

13

Counsel.

14

preserve his

granted.

I understand your argument,

But I am going to allow Mr. Westfall

to

record.

15

MR, WESTFALL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

16

THE JUDGE:

Go ahead, Counsel.

17

MR. WESTFALL:

Thank you.

Have

there

18

been instances when, during the times that Mr. Lent

19

has visited you in the State of Utah that he has

20

consumed alcohol

in the State of Utah?

21

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

22

MR. WESTFALL:

And did his consumption of

23

alcohol

in the State of Utah on any of

24

occasions

25

differences

contribute

toward your

irreconcilable

that leads you to believe that

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT
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1

marriage needs to be

terminated?

2

THE W I T N E S S :

3

MR. WESTFALL:

4

THE JUDGE:

Yes.
That's all I h a v e .
All right.

Mrs. Lent, I

5

hope I've been able to do some good for you

6

today.

Good luck to y o u , ma'am.

7

MR. WINWARD:

And Your Honor, I would

8

just

lay this record because

9

first time it has been raised

10

opportunity

11

Mr. Lent.

12

defend himself on that p o i n t .

13
14
15

the

I have not had an

to discuss alcohol consumption
He is not here for this hearing

THE JUDGE:
Counsel.

this issue, it's

You have your

with
to

record.

All right.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was

concluded.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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LaMAR J WESTWARD - A3528
Attorney for Respondent
150 North 200 East, Suite 204
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-1191

BY . _

j£

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET LUCELE LENT,
Petitioner,
vs.
NORMAN FLOYD LENT,
Respondent.

;
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL
]
]
]
)
])

Civil No. 974500368
Judge James L. Shumate

Respondents motion to dismiss came on for hearing on July 17,
1998, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Court Judge.
Petitioner was present personally and represented by counsel, G.
Michael Westfall.
Winward.

Respondent was represented by counsel, LaMar J

The Court having reviewed the file, the affidavits of the

parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
respondent's motion should be granted as to all issues except for the
issue of divorcing the parties themselves.

Therefore, the petitioner's

1

Mdmd\l(/\f\ IX

complaint, except as to the issue of divorce itself, is hereby
dismissed.
DATED this

c^

Oames L. Shumate
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and exact UN-signed copy
of the above and foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, postage prepaid, on
this _Z^_ day of July, 1998, to:
Mr. G. Michael Westfall
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770

AJz-LtoJ./l/fl X"

GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770
(435)628-1682

'' T '
M

—~~

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET LUCILE LENT,
Plaintiff

]
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN RE:
) BIFURCATED DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
NORMAN FLOYD LENT,

) Civil No. 974500368
) Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant

The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to
Bifurcate on Friday, July 17, 1998. Plaintiff was present in person and represented by her counsel
of record, G. Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT.
The Defendant was not present. However, he was represented by his counsel of record, LaMar J.
Winward. The Court granted the Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate and proceeded to take evidence on
the issue of jurisdiction and grounds to support the Petitioner's Complaint for divorce.
Consistent with the evidence presented the Court hereby makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Washington County, Utah, was an
actual and bona fide resident of Washington County, Utah, at the time these proceedings were
1
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commenced, and had been a resident of Washington County, Utah, for at least three months next
prior to the commencement of these proceedings.
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having been married on March 27,
1954, in Riverside, Bingham County, Idaho.
3. During the parties' marriage there have developed differences between them which are
irreconcilable. Those irreconcilable differences include the Defendant's infidelity and his use and
abuse of alcohol.
4. The parties separated in January of 1989 when the Plaintiff moved to Utah to further her
education and not have lived together as husband and wife since that time.
5. The parties have attempted to reconcile their differences by visiting each other during the
time of their separation. Despite their efforts to reconcile, irreconcilable differences remain. The
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and effective immediately upon signature and
entry.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties marriage by reason of the Plaintiffs residence
in the State of Utah consistent with UCA §30-3-1 and, therefore, has the authority to grant a Decree
of Divorce to the Plaintiff, severing the bonds of matrimony between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of

2

irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and effective immediately upon signature and
entry.
DATED this

{<Q day of

^ LL

.,1998.

B^THE COURT:

Jajrfes L. Shumate
-'District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

LaMar J. Wirrovard
Attorney for Defendant
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